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Problems of Kierkegaard’s Poetics 
 
Thomas Gilbert 
 
hough Søren Kierkegaard’s theology dissertation, On 
the Concept of Irony, represents the very beginning of 
his authorship, its substance displays a remarkable 
thematic uniformity with both the late pseudonymous works as 
well as his signed Edifying Discourses.  In this work, Kierkegaard 
criticizes the German Romantics’ extensive and sustained use of 
literary irony in order to define selfhood.  This irony manifests 
itself especially in the writings of Schlegel and Fichte, whose 
characters are often unconstrained by conventional morality and 
manage to both subsume and lampoon its tenets within their far-
reaching critiques of bourgeois society. Kierkegaard reveals his 
disgust with Schlegel’s Lucinde in unusually personal language: 
It is not only the tame ducks and geese. . .that beat 
their wings and utter a terrifying cry when they 
hear the wild birds of love whistling by overhead.  
No, it is every more deeply poetic person. . .[who] 
must endeavor to show that to live is something 
different from to dream.1 
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 He further discusses at length the exact stylistic trait of Lucinde 
that he finds so offensive: 
Were it possible to imagine that the whole of Lu-
cinde were merely a caprice. . .who then would be 
so ridiculous as not to laugh at it?  But this is not 
the case.  [Its] audacity. . .is so amiable and inter-
esting that ethics, modesty, and decency, which at 
first glance have some attraction, seem rather in-
significant entities by comparison.2 
 
If we ignore the rhetorical irony Kierkegaard himself has weaved 
into his hermeneutic, we begin to sense the nature of his resent-
ment: it is precisely because Lucinde is meant to be taken serious-
ly that Kierkegaard denounces it as amoral. For Kierkegaard, the 
novel expresses an unholy conflation of ethics and Romantic aes-
thetics.  The young philosopher wants these categories properly 
differentiated, as he explains in a key later passage: 
Poetry is a kind of reconciliation, though not the 
true reconciliation. . . Instead, it reconciles me 
with the given actuality by giving me another ac-
tuality, a higher and more perfect. . .it often be-
comes no reconciliation at all but rather animosity.  
Only the religious, therefore, is capable of effect-
ing the true reconciliation, for it renders actuality 
infinite for me.3  
 
Furthermore: 
He who enjoys poetically, were he to enjoy the 
whole world, would still lack one enjoyment: he 
does not enjoy himself.  To enjoy oneself is alone 
the true infinity.4 
 
Though presenting a complicated metaphysical hierarchy, Kier-
kegaard repeatedly emphasizes that Romantic irony presents a 
false definition of selfhood: a superficial poeticization of the real 
world and its faults that can never truly free oneself from the un-
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bearably unsatisfactory world that irony lambastes.  As we our-
selves are agents within the world, our conception of self re-
quires something more than the coy negativity at the heart of Lu-
cinde. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s take on Romantic irony grows 
directly out of his critique of all irony; it is a wonderful tool for 
dismantling the superficial institutions of society, but refuses to 
posit anything in return.  It leaves one in a state of negative free-
dom, not able to be serious about oneself and to oneself. 
However, Kierkegaard admits that Romantic irony—and by 
extension, to live aesthetically—remains necessary for one’s per-
sonal development.  First, it is a crucial tool in the quest to nar-
rate one’s own life, as one requires an ironic viewpoint to achieve 
enough self-distance to conceive of oneself in relation to other 
people.  Positive self-reflection is thus a form of irony.  We must 
devalue certain moments of our lives and lift up others as mo-
ments of profound realization or “turning points.”  In forming a 
relation to myself, “myself” becomes clear to me.  Second, even if 
this self-distance never transcends cold irony, it is necessary to 
pass through it in order to discover that very coldness, and its 
internal ethical contradictions relative to an opposite, life-
affirming project.  This discovery and subsequent redefinition of 
self represents the well-known Kierkegaardian “spheres of be-
ing,” moving from mere citizen to an aesthete to the ethical and 
finally to the religious.  I posit, however, that Kierkegaard’s defi-
nitions of the aesthetic and the religious, as outlined in his future 
career as an author, perform so many of the same functions for 
one’s identity that the author himself remained in profound in-
tellectual confusion regarding their respective categories.  I will 
trace this confusion through many years of his authorship and a 
brief discussion of relevant academic work. 
Scholar K. Brian Söderquist has argued that Kierkegaard’s 
conception of religious territory—especially as an answer to aes-
thetic irony—cannot even be publicly discussed because the de-
bate itself has been moved outside of human categories.  Describ-
ing Anti-Climacus’ (the pseudonymous author of The Sickness 
Unto Death) analysis of the “defiant poet,” Söderquist argues 
Kierkegaard “points to inwardness as the solution to overcoming 
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the inclination to control self-interpretation . . .pointing to psy-
chological territory.”5  That is, Kierkegaard conceives of the reli-
gious as the answer to the aesthete’s ethical problems; through 
an inexpressible inwardness grounded in God rather than mere 
“egoism of words,” the pious man can maintain a joyful self-
awareness without trying to express that awareness, which would 
automatically drive him into ironic reflection and mere poetic 
self-interpretation.  However, I instead believe that Kierkegaard 
did in fact seek a path by which he could both embody and ex-
press this religious category—the authorship itself, which he 
hoped could both poetize religious truth while preserving his 
own incommunicable inwardness.  Kierkegaard attempts this 
through the dialectical nature of his pseudonymous works and 
careful, obsessive experimentation with poeticizing his own 
identity.  However, as we shall see, even this author-experiment 
fails to succeed. 
Before analyzing several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
works in turn, we will first examine his clearest statement of the 
author-experiment itself, his unpublished The Point of View for 
My Work as an Author.  Speaking in his own name at the culmina-
tion of the entire authorship, Kierkegaard directly confronts the 
relationship between the aesthetic and religious within all of his 
works.  As we cannot know how representative the pseudonyms 
are of his own beliefs, this late work is vital as a yardstick by 
which every earlier piece of writing can be judged to fail or suc-
ceed on Kierkegaard’s own metric.  Describing his project, Kier-
kegaard acknowledges almost immediately the central conflict 
among all of his pseudonyms:  
To live only in the unconditional—the human be-
ing cannot do this; he perishes like the fish that 
must live in the air.  But on the other hand a hu-
man being cannot in the deeper sense live without 
relating himself to the unconditional; he perhaps 
goes on living, but spiritlessly.6 
 
Just as in On the Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard argues that we 
must both accept ourselves as a coequal part of the material 
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world while also attaining to the unconditional; pure irony ig-
nores the former entirely.  Still, for Kierkegaard the human 
world remains a “vortex” that provides an illusion of meaning 
and stability, while in fact it is simply “sewing without fastening 
the end.”7 One must relate oneself to something infinite, either 
through irony or a leap into Christianity, in order to complete the 
narrative tapestry that bare worldly existence is unable to pro-
vide. Yet for both the ironic and the Christian life, the exact bal-
ance between actuality and infinitude necessary to create a pro-
ductive selfhood remains unclear.  How much sewing is neces-
sary before the cloth can, or must, be fastened?  Or is this a pure-
ly individual, subjective decision, immune from Kierkegaard’s 
attempt to define such a balance?  And if so, is Kierkegaard’s ‘not 
this/nor that’ definition of selfhood anything more than a plati-
tude?  He never elaborates, and we are left to wonder if Kierke-
gaard merely chose to remain ‘joyfully silent’ about the answer 
to his proffered riddle, or if he is as lost as the rest of us.    
In the introduction to The Point of View that follows, Kierke-
gaard gives the reader the indication that even the nature of his 
authorial project, and not just the lifestyle it endorses, is incom-
municable: 
It is self-evident that I cannot present completely 
an explanation of my work as an author, that is, 
with the purely personal inwardness in which I 
possess the explanation.  In part it is because I 
cannot make my God-relationship public in this 
way, since it is neither more nor less than the uni-
versally human inwardness. . .which it would be a 
crime to suppress and a duty to stress.  In part it is 
because I cannot wish to press upon anyone some-
thing that pertains solely to my private character, 
which of course for me contains much of the ex-
planation of my author-character.8 
 
We must note that Kierkegaard equates his relationship with 
God to “universally human inwardness”: a purely human cate-
gory accessible even to the Greeks, who are criticized in The Sick-
Thomas Gilbert 42 
ness Unto Death for lacking a sense of spiritual sin and are thus 
cursed to a state of unconscious despair.  This is therefore an illu-
minating passage for its ambiguous depiction of “inwardness” as 
something both separate from and strangely synonymous with 
the very idea of God.  The authorship itself also resides inside 
Kierkegaard’s “private character” alone, and thus he cannot me-
diate our question about “inwardness” because the medium in 
which it was expressed is a part of that same “inwardness.”  In 
poker terminology, we call this a “tell.”  If the author-character is 
essentially no different from his private character (which he re-
fuses to narrate), then it is strikingly unclear to the reader exactly 
what the authorship is meant to be: either an astonishingly ad-
vanced dialectic whose pseudonymous twists and turns do some-
how indirectly communicate the correct path to self-identity, or 
else an expurgated form of personal therapy which Kierkegaard 
feels un-obligated to unpack for public understanding.  If the fi-
nal goal of the authorship has been to balance a silent, reverent, 
inward infinity with the flamboyant and expressive demands of 
aesthetic living, then the answer to the riddle lies only in the 
works themselves.  While The Point of View does address the 
identity-dilemma Kierkegaard claims to have answered in previ-
ous publications, he freely admits that the “author-character” 
himself cannot perform the same service. 
This unresolved tension continues within Part One of The 
Point of View.  While Kierkegaard works hard to convince the 
reader that his pseudonymous work consistently presented an 
aesthetic viewpoint, he also claims he always was and remains a 
religious author.  Near the beginning of his “Explanation” he 
gives a wooden and confusing interpretation of this authorial 
intentionality: 
. . .qua human being I may be justified in making a 
declaration [on my authorship as a whole], and 
from the religious point of view it may be my du-
ty to make a declaration.  But this must not be 
confused with the authorship—qua author it does 
not help very much that I qua human being de-
clare that I have intended this and that.  But pre-
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sumably everyone will admit that if it can be 
shown that such and such a phenomenon cannot 
be explained in any other way, and that on the 
other hand it can in this way be explained at every 
point, or that this explanation fits at every point, 
then the correctness of this explanation is substan-
tiated as clearly as the correctness of an explana-
tion can ever be substantiated.9 
 
In other words, Kierkegaard—unable to use the existing catego-
ries of human being or religious duty to express his work—
announces the invention of a new, intermediary category: the 
author, which is the best category simply because, tautologically, 
it is the “clearest” among all possible alternatives.  It seems that, 
as long as Kierkegaard can justify his works “at every point” as 
their true author, then even if only he can understand the true 
nature of his project, the project remains valid—and hence, pre-
sents a valid definition of selfhood.  The Point of View, then, does 
lay out Kierkegaard’s summation of his published thought and 
directly describes its goals; but the justification of those goals, as 
well as the edifying process of achieving them, can only be expe-
rienced through the indirect communication of the pseudony-
mous works.  The Point of View thus accomplishes its intention, 
which is merely to conceptualize the authorship rather than arbi-
trate or even explicate the claims of specific works.  Kierkegaard 
believed that to simply spell out the complex balance of self-
hood—ironic vs. religious, actuality vs. infinitude—prevents the 
reader from forming a relation with each element of that balance 
and thus arriving at the answer.  We must therefore turn to Kier-
kegaard’s key pseudonymous works, each of which presents a 
different balance in the elements of selfhood.  We can then see if 
each of them presents, at the very least, consistent definitions of 
philosophical terms and categories.  For The Point of View’s argu-
ment about the cohesive and unified shape of the authorship to 
remain plausible, this is the minimum requirement, because dia-
lectic—as well as dialogue—cannot succeed if the different 
“speakers” or works are not using the same language.  
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We begin with Either/Or, the first major pseudonymous 
work, containing no less than three distinct voices, one of 
which—“A”/Johannes the Seducer—represents Kierkegaard’s 
longest sustained and most incisive depiction of the aesthete in 
any of his publications.  “The Seducer’s Diary” in specific reveals 
how Johannes plays with the categories of the aesthetic and the 
religious—and with much more success than Kierkegaard had 
with Regine Olsen, his relationship with whom is poetically rein-
terpreted within the Diary.  Thus Johannes, rather than lying 
squarely in the aesthetic realm, actually occupies an ambiguous 
space between it and the religious as well as Kierkegaard him-
self; or at least, Johannes’ knowledge of these categories is so 
great that he can poetize himself into any one of them at will. 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the aesthetic qua Johannes, in fact, is so 
powerful that the author inadvertently begins to tear down his 
own project—to actually sanctify Johannes. 
Our sense of Johannes’ preternatural awareness of the reli-
gious comes from Victor Eremita, the textual editor of Either/Or, 
whose introduction to the Diary is a bit too praising of the Seduc-
er’s abilities.  While clearly stating that Johannes suffers from a 
great “sickness,” Eremita also contends that he was “too strong” 
for reality and that he had “too spiritual a nature to be a seducer 
in the usual sense.”10 This hearkens us to the variegated formulas 
for despair presented by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto 
Death, and if we wish to treat the works as a single dialectic 
(which The Point of View compels us to do), then we must assume 
that Victor is well past “weak” despair and in an advanced state 
of defiance before God.  But the rub here is Johannes’ spirit: Er-
emita even repeats that “he lived in far too spiritual a manner to 
be a seducer in the ordinary sense,” as if in awe of Johannes’ abil-
ities.11  Cordelia herself admits that Johannes is so spiritual that 
she feels “annihilated as a woman” when in his presence.12 And 
Anti-Climacus, several years later, also states that the highest de-
mand that can be made on man is simply that he becomes spir-
it.13  So it is not a good sign that the editor of the whole of Either/
Or, half of which (Judge Vilhelm’s contribution) is supposed to 
lie above or beyond the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s metaphysics, 
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is reduced to helpless wonder at how spiritual Johannes truly is.   
I am assuming here, perhaps unfairly, that Victor Eremita is a 
double for Kierkegaard himself.  Or perhaps in elevating Johan-
nes as highly as possible, Kierkegaard is setting him up for the 
greatest possible fall.  However, there is one more passage from 
Eremita’s introduction that will verify our doubts about Johan-
nes’ specific place on the irony-religion spectrum.  Eremita di-
rectly describes the despair of Johannes: 
It is not in external respects that he has led the 
others astray, but in ways that affect them inward-
ly. . .A person who goes astray inwardly has less 
room for maneuver; he soon finds he is going 
round in a circle from which he cannot escape.  
This, on an even more terrible scale, I think, is 
how it will go with him. . . he is thus constantly 
seeking an exit and forever finding an entrance 
through which he returns into himself.14 
 
In other words, Johannes runs the risk of losing himself in in-
ward infinity—the very territory, as we have seen, that the iro-
nist should be unable to access.  We know from On the Concept of 
Irony that the Romantics exist in a state of external infinity while 
a meaningful depth-of-self remains impossible to achieve.  Ra-
ther, should Johannes slip into aesthetic despair, then all he 
would have access to is himself: he would be enjoying himself too 
much, and would be completely unable to escape the misanthrop-
ic games that he enjoys playing with himself and others.  
Through his godlike command of seduction, Johannes not only 
“fastens the end” of himself in infinitude but can sew backwards 
and forwards at will!   
Again, strictly speaking, this is not a contradiction on Kierke-
gaard’s part; Eremita himself offers a rather aesthetic definition 
of aesthetic despair, with metaphorical foxholes, lights behind 
half-open doors, and travelers who somehow find themselves 
back where they began.  We can only speculate whether Eremita 
himself suffers from an inchoate aesthetic fixation, and it is thus 
improper for us to count this categorical confusion as hard proof 
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for the aesthete’s access to inward infinity or Kierkegaard’s per-
sonal confusion therein.  But what does it say about the meta-
author himself that during his best opportunity to argue for Jo-
hannes’ shortcomings—other than the stuffy logorrhea of Judge 
Vilhelm—the worst he can come up with is that Johannes might 
find himself locked inside the paradise accessible only to the reli-
gious?  We must ask: what then is the difference? 
But if Eremita, like Cordelia and even Judge Vilhelm, has 
been so seduced by Johannes that any criticism they have of him 
comes off as an aesthetic compliment, the same certainly cannot 
be said for Anti-Climacus, who is absolutely not an aesthete and 
openly proclaims in his introduction to The Sickness Unto Death 
that his essay is meant to be both rigorous and edifying (and not 
so strong in either category so as to disqualify the other).  True, 
we are still reading a pseudonymous work, though we know 
from Kierkegaard’s journals that he nearly used his own name to 
sign the text, deciding otherwise only because he felt Anti-
Climacus’s understanding of Christianity is clearer than his own.  
This authorial detail is especially important, because even Anti-
Climacus’s account draws an awkward and blurred line between 
the aesthetic and the religious, so that Kierkegaard’s position in 
the mess is not at all clear. 
Our relevant passages immediately precede and follow the 
introduction of Part Two of The Sickness Unto Death, where Anti-
Climacus specifically singles out the poetic individual as existing 
in the highest form of despair—defiance—as well as sin.  The last 
paragraph of Part One reads: 
[This despair] is, to describe it figuratively, as if a 
writer were to make a slip of the pen, and the er-
ror became conscious of itself as such. . .and as if 
this error wanted now to rebel against the author, 
out of hatred for him forbid him to correct it, and 
in manic defiance say to him: ‘No, I will not be 
erased, I will stand as a witness against you, a wit-
ness to the fact that you are a second-rate au-
thor.’15 
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In context this “author” is the god-like force that created the des-
pairing individual, referred to in The Point of View as 
“Governance” and elsewhere in the authorship simply as God: 
the agent that has determinately established an individual within 
the world and which has defined that individual’s relation with 
others and himself.  It is when this individual perceives that this 
“given” relation is somehow deficient that he decides to retreat 
into the poetic and usurp power from the Establishing Force—to 
re-forge himself into how he should have been created.  Anti-
Climacus thus reframes the poetic mindset as rebellion against 
the will of God.  But there is another unintentional “tell” hidden 
under the surface of this passage.  While the aesthete is in rebel-
lion with God, we cannot help but note the unstated communion 
that he and his Creator share, as dual creators fashioning the 
world the way each believes it is meant to be.  The “writer” here 
is God—or is it instead the poet, despairing not over himself as 
an inferior creation under God, but as a creator despairing over 
his own new creation—himself?  If this second interpretation is 
indeed right, then it is not the rebellion against God which is sali-
ent; rather, it is only when the poet rebels against himself that 
true despair sets in.   
And there is yet another level in which God is the one in des-
pair, woefully observing the failure of his human creation to 
obey its calling in life.  Therefore, the poet’s victory is not to per-
fectly recreate himself and fix God’s mistake—that will come lat-
er.  The poet’s success comes first when he forces God to blink; in 
this way, God will fall into despair before the poet himself suc-
cumbs upon realizing his own authorial shortcomings.  The goal 
of the despairer is not just to author himself, or to refuse to admit 
that he is beholden to a creator, but actually to make God realize 
that the true despairer is He.  Beneath the surface of this ostensi-
bly simple anecdote comparing despair to the act of writing, we 
are actually watching an absurd, multi-tiered game of “Chicken” 
in which God and the Poet are waiting to see who will despair 
first.  What is therefore crucial for us is that God and the Poet are 
placed on equal terms; any sense of superior self-conception is 
ruled out by this harsh and unforgiving dichotomy—presented, 
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we must remember, through a metaphor about writing, author-
ship, and the ability of fabricated voices to revolt and claim victo-
ry over their creators.  Kierkegaard himself admitted that Anti-
Climacus was the one pseudonym that he wanted to be, and it 
would be entirely in Kierkegaard’s character to engage in this 
vertiginous level of meta-authorial reflection. 
Anti-Climacus offers a further complication with his contin-
ued dissection of the poet, early in Part Two: 
. . . the most dialectical border-line case between 
despair and sin, namely   . . .a poet-existence in-
clined towards the religious. . . He loves God 
above everything, God who is the only comfort in 
his secret torment, and yet he loves the torment, 
he will not let go of it. . . he allows himself poeti-
cally to falsify God just a little. . . he wants to hold 
[his torment] at arm’s length, but that means pre-
cisely keeping hold of it. . . His conflict is really 
this: Has he been called?  Is the thorn in the flesh a 
sign that he is to be put to extraordinary use?. . . 
Or is the thorn in the flesh what he must humble 
himself under in order to attain the universally 
human?16 
 
We notice two slips here: one, the complete de-emphasis on the 
ethical sphere in Anti-Climacus’s ontology; and two, the despair-
ing ambiguity that Anti-Climacus himself is in regarding the exact 
root of the poet’s “conflict.”  Other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms 
have explored the territory on the edge of the ethical before de-
parting to the religious—a territory that does require a leap to 
faith in order to be navigable—but we have been given no indi-
cation that the poet can somehow catapult over the ethical to ar-
rive at this point.  Indeed, in an endnote to his translation of this 
passage, scholar Alastair Hannay argues that its disagreement 
with Kierkegaard’s aesthetic-ethical-religious spheres owes to it 
being a  “clearly autobiographical” addition, and he quotes a 
passage from the Journals where Kierkegaard elaborates on the 
poet’s despair over God in relation to his own biography.17 Han-
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nay is likely correct that Kierkegaard is drawing on personal 
emotional conflicts to enrich his philosophy, but once again the 
dialectic of the authorship—if taken as one uniform project—does 
not leave room for such ambiguities.  The glaring absence of the 
ethical in Anti-Climacus’ analysis, which is not rectified any-
where else in the text, is greatly damaging for the authorship-
coherence that The Point of View relies upon. 
Anti-Climacus’ own uncertainty about the poet’s problems is 
even more jarring.  Crucially, he does not argue that the poet 
should abandon his profession so that he can pursue God’s plan 
for him. The poet is a poet, and must find a way to balance his 
aesthetic skills with complete dedication to the ultimate Author.  
But just as in the example of Richard III repeated throughout the 
text, it is unclear if the poet is “strong” enough to succeed in spite 
of his hunchback or instead achieve apotheosis by confessing the 
limitations of being all-too-human.  Kierkegaard himself knows 
he has been authored as a poet, but he is unhealthily aware both 
of the poet’s responsibility for his own authorship, as well as the 
requisite-yet-murky need to attribute his poetic successes to 
God’s influence.  In fact, this exact statement opens The Point of 
View: “one thing absorbs me unconditionally. . . to express as 
honestly and as strongly as possible. . . how infinitely more Gov-
ernance has done for me than I had ever expected.”18 To have 
been authored in order to engage in a career whose substance is 
a miniature perversion of Governance itself is of course a para-
dox that all aesthetes must confront.  However, the statement of 
this question without resolution sacrifices a communicable philo-
sophical program in favor of expressing Kierkegaard’s own spe-
cific neuroses. 
I therefore conclude that the reliance of The Point of View on 
the argumentative persuasion of the pseudonymous authorship 
is unfounded, as the published pseudonymous works at the be-
ginning and end of Kierkegaard’s productivity present deeply 
muddled and radically different pictures of the relationship be-
tween the categories of the aesthetic and the religious.  Kierke-
gaard’s authorship does not display a coherent, positive defini-
tion of self-identity, however much his works share the same the-
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matic fixations: living poetically, tragic love, and religious recon-
ciliation.  Yet these themes are salient for understanding what 
deep unity there is in Kierkegaard’s writing, and I believe it is 
more likely a result of the biographical events and decisions in 
Kierkegaard’s life, rather than a predetermined and fully con-
sistent dialectical writing structure, which fueled his creative en-
ergy in producing the pseudonyms, torn as they are (and as he 
was) between aesthetic and religious approaches to emotional 
pain. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue this claim, 
I believe Kierkegaard biographer Joakim Garff has accurately 
described the simultaneously subconscious and ubiquitous 
placement of biographical details in the authorship: 
. . . And even though Regine [Olsen, Kierke-
gaard’s fiancée] is not named one single time in 
the whole of Kierkegaard’s published works, she 
is intertwined with it like an erotic arabesque, full 
of longing, sometimes confronting the reader 
when one least expects it.19 
 
To author oneself, however religiously, is ultimately indistin-
guishable from describing oneself, with all the requisite contra-
dictions and unresolved psychology entailed in such a massive 
undertaking.  And Kierkegaard, writing himself to death in pur-
suit of that ephemeral reconciliation between the poetic and reli-
gious modes of being, laid it all out for us to see.  Here we see 
why, even as the authorship moved beyond the aesthetic and the 
ethical to the exclusively religious, the poet hangs on for dear life 
as the easy way out, the tempting reconciliation with the world 
that Kierkegaard so desperately craved.  Our discovery, there-
fore, is not that his authorship is in any way confusing or lacking 
unto itself, but rather that the wonderful castles of Kierkegaard’s 
thought often sagged under the weight of his highly personal, 
and tragic, interest in quickly resolving these problems of self-
hood. 
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